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These briefings have been drafted by the Parliament Secretariat Task Force 
on the Intergovernmental Conference. Their purpose is to gather together, 
in an organized, summary form, the proposals and suggestions which the 
authorities in the Member States, the Union's institutions and specialist 
commentators have put forward on the issues likely to be on the IGC/96 
agenda. 
Briefings will be updated as negotiations proceed. 
Already out: 
The Court of Justice 
2 The Commission 
3 The Court of Auditors, ESC and COR 
4 Differentiated integration. 
5 The common foreign and security policy 
6 The role of the national parliaments 
7 The hierarchy of Community acts 
8 The codecision procedure 
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VIEWS ON REVISION OF THE CODECISION PROCEDURE 
Introduction 
The codecision procedure introduced by Article 189b of the Treaty on European 
Union confirms the trend, which was heralded by the conciliation procedure 
introduced in 1975, and subsequently by the cooperation procedure set up by the 
Single European Act, towards basing legislative decision-making processes on 
dialogue and negotiation between Parliament/the Council and the Commission. 
Unlike the cooperation procedure, in which the Council has the last word, the 
codecision procedure provides for a stage of conciliation between the 
representatives of the Council and Parliament (Conciliation Committee) in cases 
where the Council is unable to accept all of Parliament's second-reading 
amendments, and makes it possible for the latter ultimately to reject the act 
adopted by the Council (Article 189b ( 3)) . The codecision procedure thus 
provides for the adoption of a common act by the Council and Parliament, 
concluding a shuttle procedure in which the two institutions should be on an 
equal footing. 
Parliament is automatically involved in the legislative procedure. This 
increases the importance of the first reading, when Parliament must be able to 
take up a position, in full knowledge of the facts, which it will then defend 
throughout the procedure using an appropriate negotiating strategy. The TEU 
sets out a cumbersome procedure which may go as far as four readings. There is 
no requirement to go through all the stages of the procedure; on the contrary: 
the aim should be to reach agreement in the early stages of the procedure so as 
to avoid, if possible, entrenched positions which would make it excessively 
lengthy. 
The codecision procedure is seen, by and large, in a fairly positive light. The 
Conciliation Committee has been the forum providing a focus for technical 
differences and horizontal institutional and budgetary problems. Since the TEU 
entered into force, 124 proposals for Community acts covered by codecision have 
been put forward by the Commission. Thirty-three have been adopted, 15 of them 
actually at second reading. Only one act has been rejected by Parliament at 
third reading (EP decision of 19 July 1994 on the proposal for a Directive on 
the application of open network provision (ONP) to voice telephony), and one 
other has been rejected by Parliament despite agreement having been reached 
within the Conciliation Committee (EP decision of 1 March 1995 on the proposal 
for a Directive on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions). 
The difficulties experienced initially were not attributable to the procedure 
itself, but to the political linkage made with a number of sensitive 
institutional issues, such as commitology and amounts deemed necessary (ADNs). 
These problems have now been overcome as a result of the modus vivendi on 
commitology agreed with Parliament and the joint declaration on ADNs, both of 
which will have to be reviewed in 1996. 
Another problem, which is partly connected with how the codecision procedure 
works, needs to be considered, namely that of efficiency, the transparency of 
the institutions and decision-making mechanisms. There is a need to simplify 
the decision-making procedures and reduce their number. It would therefore be 
desirable to see·whet-her·and·now -any'Procedures -,::an-·be--droppea, ·and if -sQ,· which 
ones. The institutions have already begun to express their views on this. Some 
Member States have come out in favour of a full or partial extension of the 
codecision procedure to cover areas subject to qualified majority voting in the 
Council. 
Summaries or extracts of the positions taken by the following are given below: 
- Parliament 
- the Commission 
- the Council and the Deputy Permanent Representatives 
- the Member States 
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- Justus Lipsius 
- the Bertelsmann Foundation. 
PARLIAMENT 
Views of the Parliament delegation to the Conciliation Committee 
The procedure used is cumbersome and complex. 
Meetings are very frequent (one or two per week) . If the codecision procedure 
were used more extensively, the number of acts requiring recourse to the 
Conciliation Committee would be even greater; hence the need to ensure better 
planning and group texts together in 'packages'. 
The time-limits are too tight, particularly since the Council Secretariat is 
often late in forwarding legislative texts. The time-limits could be extended, 
which would make more thorough preparation possible, and likewise informal 
discussions with the Council in advance. 
Political representation on the Council side is essential. It would help the 
Council to speak with one voice and increase its members' room for manoeuvre. 
Harmonization of voting procedures might be suggested in order to avoid the 
current imbalance between the two types of majority required (a qualified 
majority to reject a common position, and a simple majority to adopt a joint 
text), which reduces Parliament's room for manoeuvre. 
Given the horizontal problems which are likely to arise, a representative of the 
Committee on Institutional Affairs and a representative of the Committee on 
Budgets, mandated by their respective committees, should be involved. 
Codecision should be used more extensively. 
Committee on Institutional Affairs 
Bourlanges/Martin report adopted in plenary on 17 May 1995 
The codecision procedure should be simplified by making the following changes: 
end the procedure when there is agreement between the Council and Parliament 
at first reading; 
drop the stage of intention to reject; 
introduce a simplified conciliation procedure at the end of the first 
reading; 
give the Commission the power to propose and put to the vote, 
Conciliation Committee delegations, a compromise between 
positions; 
in the two 
conflicting 
harmonize the- maj'Orities--Fequit:ed- for- r-ejecting the- f-inal text. (regardless 
of the results of conciliation); 
eliminate the possibility of the Council acting unilaterally (by reconfirming 
its common position) in the event of conciliation failing to result in an 
agreement. 
COMMISSION 
Report on the functioning of the TEU (May 1995) 
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Contrary to a number of fears engendered by its complexity and length, the 
codecision procedure has so far worked well. It has enabled decisions to be 
taken within a reasonable length of time, notably as a result of satisfactory 
cooperation between the institutions. To this end, they signed an 
interinstitutional agreement on 21 October 1993 on the modus operandi of the 
Conciliation Committee. Taking only Commission proposals submitted since the 
Treaty entered into force into account·, the average time taken by the procedure 
is less than 300 days. A longer period will be needed, however, to refine this 
assessment. 
COUNCIL 
Report on the functioning of the TEU (March 1995) 
The operation of the codecision procedure has been complicated by the following: 
the linkage initially made by Parliament to other issues (such as commitology 
and ADNs), which delayed the adoption of several texts; 
the complexity of the procedure laid down in Article 189b, despite the 
practical arrangements agreed upon to facilitate its operation; 
the demand sometimes made by Parliament's representatives for the 
Conciliation Committee to accept amendments rejected by Parliament in plenary 
(and hence outside the normal scope of conciliation); 
relations between the Conciliation Committee and Parliament sitting in 
plenary. 
Informal exchange of views between the Deputy Permanent Representatives 
(8 February 1995) 
The Deputy Permanent Representatives have made a number of comments and 
suggestions on the operation of the codecision procedure. 
Practical improvements requiring no changes to the Treaty: 
strengthening the trialogue: the success of 'plenary' conciliation is heavily 
dependent on the effectiveness of preparatory work within the trialogue; 
this stage of the procedure should be strengthened, for instance by 
designating a minister with special responsibility for dialogue with 
Parliament; this suggestion was criticized by the UK delegation, which 
expressed the fear that the minister concerned would quickly become hostage 
to Parliament; 
where the Council and Parliament positions differ only slightly: experience 
has shown that differences between the Council and Parliament have sometimes 
been merely matters of form rather than substance; the question is whether 
it would be possible to envisage a simplified procedure under which an 
agreement between the two institutions could swiftly be decided, in return 
for a few minor adjustments to the text, without recourse to the cumbersome 
Conciliation Committee procedure. 
Improvements -requi-ring· changes to ·-the Treaty: · 
clarification of the scope of conciliation: Article 189b should state more 
clearly that conciliation can apply only to amendments to the common position 
adopted by Parliament in plenary, and to no other provisions; 
elimination of Parliament's first reading: this step is favoured by a 
majority of delegations, in the interest of simplification; 
elimination of the procedure of 'intention to reject' (Article 189b(2) (c)); 
elimination of the 'third reading' (confirmation by the Council of its common 
position and possibility of rejection by Parliament); the effect of this 
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change would be that the conciliation stage would complete the procedure 
(with a positive or negative outcome) and that the two co-legislators 
(Parliament and the Council) would thus be placed on a strictly equal 
footing, with each bearing equal responsibility for the success or failure 
of conciliation; 
scope of the procedure, entailing two aspects: 
(a) restoring a degree of consistency: it is hard to justify the existence 
of different procedures for the Leonardo and Socrates programmes; 
(b) extending the scope to give more power to Parliament: in these 
circumstances, the existence of a hierarchy of Community acts would make 
it possible for all legislation which has general application to be 
adopted on the basis of codecision, counterbalanced by implementing 
measures being solely a matter for the Commission and the Council; in 
the event of the legislative process being deadlocked (insuperable 
differences between the Council and Parliament), and in a situation 
requiring urgent action, the Council should be able to legislate 
unilaterally for a specified period ('Orders in Council' arrangement). 
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Views of 'Mr Justus Lipsius' (February 1995) 
The cooperation procedure could be abandoned and merged with codecision to 
produce a new, simpler, unified procedure, since two complex procedures 
constitute over-sophistication; the scope of the new procedure could combine 
that of both Article 189c and Article 189b; the new procedure could strengthen 
the powers of Parliament in order to put it on an equal footing with the 
Council; Article 189b could be used as a basis and amended as follows: 
paragraph 2(c) would be deleted: it adds greatly to the complexity of the 
procedure without fulfilling any other useful function; 
paragraph 3 would be amended to enable the Council to accept easily as many 
of Parliament's amendments as possible; 
paragraph 4 would be amended to enable the Conciliation Committee to adopt 
the legislative act directly in the event of agreement being reached; 
paragraph 5 could consequently be deleted; 
whenever the Conciliation Committee was unable to agree a joint text, the 
proposed act would be deemed not to have been adopted; paragraph 6 of 
Article 189b could consequently also be deleted. 
Views of the Bertelsmann Foundation 
In the interests of democracy Parliament must be granted the right of codecision 
on all European affairs. Development of the Union should move towards a 
bicameral system in which Parliament would constitute one Chamber and the 
Council of the Union the other, forming an Assembly of European States. The 
democratic principle and the federal principle can be combined by ensuring that 
all key decisions are taken by both Chambers, acting on an equal footing. 
Substantial simplification of the complex principles on which the Treaties are 
based, and of European decision-making processes and procedures, provides 
another potential source of legitimacy. 
A unified procedure must embody a number of stages: 
the Commission submits to the Council and Parliament proposals for the 
adoption of new legal acts; in the cases specified in the TEU such proposa~s 
are also forwarded to the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions; once the Council has received the opinions of those two bodies, 
it draws up and adopts a common position, which it forwards to Parliament; 
Parliament considers the draft text, may amend it and adopts a decision 
thereon; it is then returned to the Council of Ministers; 
if the draft text fails to secure a sufficient majority in favour in the 
Council, the latter may (like Parliament or the Commission) refer it to the 
Conciliation Commit tee, which comprises equal numbers of Parliament and 
Council representatives and meetings of which are chaired by a non-voting 
Member of the Commission; 
if agreement is reached within the Conciliation Committee, the legislative 
act concerned is adopted, following approval by both Chambers. 
* 
* * 
For further informatio~_4bout_~his _briefing, please contact Mrs Prode in the 
secretariat of the Committee on Institutional Affairs (Tel. 284 3510 -Brussels) 
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